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I. INTRODUCTION
Eight years ago, the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of
judicial review of agency lawmaking. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the Court stopped waffling over
whether agency interpretation of statutes is entitled to deference from
the courts.2 Coming down firmly on the side of judicial deference, the
Chevron Court developed a review standard that commands, more
often than not, that it is for the agency, not the Court, to say what
*Associate Professor of Law, Univergity of Georgia. I thank Melinda Branscomb, Dan Coenen,
John Garvey, and Paul Kurtz for their helpful comments on this article. I also thank my research
assistants, Patricia Rhodes and Glenn Spencer, for their work.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Prior to Chevron, two competing models of judicial review existed, one deferential to
agencies, and the other far less so. Chevron "announced the end of judicial vacillation between
these two interpretive models." Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance
of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455 (1989); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972-75 (1992) (discussing
varying pre-Chevron methods used by the Supreme Court in determining when to defer to
agency interpretation of statutes); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) (stating the Chevron decision was evolutionary because it
refined a long line of Supreme Court precedent, reminding lower courts to defer to agencies'
reasonable constructions of statutes).
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the law is.3 The Court's Chevron decision recognized statutory in-
terpretation for the policymaking that it frequently is.4 The Chevron
review process placed policymaking into the hands of politically ac-
countable agencies, instead of politically unaccountable courts.5
3. Chevron promulgated the following two-step approach to judicial review of agency in-
terpretations of statutes:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the Court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
467 U.S. at 842-43.
The decision has had considerable impact. As noted recently by a leading scholar, "Chevron
promises to be a pillar in administrative law for many years to come. It has become a kind of
Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state." Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Admin-
istration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1991). Professor Sunstein's reference,
of course, was to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in which the Court
determined "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." Id. at 177.
4. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. The Court noted that:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly concep-
tualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether
it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must
fail. In such a case, federal judges - who have no constituency - have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
Id.
Chevron thus equated the interpretation of ambiguous statutes to the making of policy
choices. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline
of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 281 (1988) ("[A] choice of an interpretation
of an unclear statute is truly a choice among policies."); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2087-88.
Sunstein states:
Chevron is best understood and defended as a frank recognition that sometimes
interpretation is not simply a matter of uncovering legislative will, but also involves
extratextual considerations of various kinds, including judgments about how a
statute is best or most sensibly implemented. Chevron reflects a salutary under-
standing that these judgments of policy and principle should be made by adminis-
trators rather than judges.
Id.
Moreover, under Chevron, statutory silences or ambiguities are viewed as implied delegations
of policymaking power to the agency. For discussion of this critical aspect of the Chevron
decision, see, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation:
An Introduction, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 243, 246 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 301, 305 (1988).
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. Chevron expressly relied on agencies' greater political accoun-
tability to support the review standard it adopted. Id. When policy choices are to be made, the
(Vol. 44
HeinOnline  -- 44 Fla. L. Rev. 724 1992
STARE DECISIS EXCEPTION
However, despite its broad counter-Marbury mandate, 6 Chevron
has not resulted in wholesale acquiescence by the Supreme Court to
agency readings of statutes.7 Rather, Chevron deference has emerged
as just one canon of statutory construction.8 There remain in place
competing canons that at times conflict with Chevron.9 In the face of
such conflicts, when should Chevron deference prevail?1°
In this article, I discuss how Chevron intersects with one important
competing norm - stare decisis. Stare decisis counsels the Court to
adhere to its own decisions, particularly statutory ones, absent sub-
stantial justification for departure." To what extent should stare de-
Court determined that Congress generally would prefer those choices to be made by an entity
accountable to the political process. Id. Moreover, Chevron "broke new ground by invoking
democratic theory as a basis" for its deferential approach to judicial review. Merrill, supra note
2, at 978.
6. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2075.
7. See Merrill, supra note 2. Professor Merrill denies that Chevron really is a counter-Mar-
bury, at least as applied by the Supreme Court. Instead, he asserts Chevron is being used by
the Court in only about one-half of the cases in which it would seem to apply. Id. at 969, 983-84.
Its effect, he states, is greater at the lower court level, where the circuit courts have considered
themselves bound to follow Chevron. Id. According to Professor Merrill, Chevron, while it has
resulted in more deference, has not accomplished the "complete revolution" its analysis would
seem to dictate. Id. at 980, 982-83.
8. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2105; see Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 516 (stating that in the face of ambiguity, Chevron
establishes a presumption that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
agency). See, e.g., Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REv. 757, 759-61 (1991); Farina, supra note 2, at 469-70;
Merrill, supra note 2, at 988-89. Still others have read it more narrowly. See, e.g., Maureen
B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal
Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1275.
9. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct.
1227, 1235 (1991) (holding that the presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation
outweighs the agency's opposing interpretation); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-78 (1988) (holding that the Court will
construe the statute to avoid the constitutional question, despite a contrary interpretation by
the agency).
10. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2108-19, for a discussion of Chevron's intersection with
constitutionally-inspired and various other norms. Professor Sunstein suggests, for example,
that constitutionally-inspired norms trump Chevron, as evidenced by the Court's decision in
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 568. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2110. But see Merrill,
supra note 2, at 988-89 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (implying that constitu-
tionally-inspired canons do not necessarily mandate against deference where regulation does not
give rise to "grave and doubtful constitutional questions")).
11. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). Under the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court follows its decisions unless they are overruled by Congress or by the
Court itself. Decisions will be overruled by the Court only when substantial justification for
doing so exists. Id. While the Supreme Court applies stare decisis in constitutional interpretation
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cisis apply when an agency's interpretation of a statute, otherwise
deserving of deference under Chevron, conflicts with a prior interpre-
tation of the statute by the Supreme Court?
This article suggests the following answer: If the Court's prior
opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading
of the statute, but not the only one possible, and the agency thereafter
adopts a different interpretation, the new reading is entitled to defer-
ence under Chevron, free from the constraints of stare decisis. Defer-
ence to the agency poses no true conflict with stare decisis because
the prior opinion has not purported to definitively construe the stat-
ute.1
2
However, when the Court has previously decided a case under a
Chevron review standard and has rejected the agency's interpretation
as inconsistent with clear statutory meaning or as irrational, the Court
may rely upon stare decisis to reject the agency's request that the
Court change its mind. 13 Similarly, the norm of stare decisis should
prevail if the Court has previously upheld the agency's position as the
only reasonable interpretation of the statute, and the agency later
changes course. 14 Because in either case the initial decision gave the
agency the full measure of Chevron deference, application of stare
decisis in future cases poses no true conflict with the principles under-
lying Chevron.15
cases, the doctrine has added force in cases of statutory interpretation. Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1991). This "super strong" presumption of correctness
accorded the Court's statutory decisions has been both criticized and praised. Compare Frank
H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422,
426-29 (1988) (criticizing -the Court's presumption of correctness in statutory decisions) and
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361 (1988) (criticizing
the Court's use of stare decisis in statutory decisions) with Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress
Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989)
(praising the strong presumption of correctness).
12. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124,
1134-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 877 (1990); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 587 (1985); infra text
accompanying notes 110-14.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 115-26.
14. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 142-44, 150 (1990).
15. Chevron does not require the Court to blindly accept the agency's statutory interpreta-
tion. Rather, the Court will first see whether the statute speaks clearly to the issue in question.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If it does, the statutory language controls. Id. If the statute is
silent or ambiguous, however, the Court will defer to the agency's rational interpretation of
the statute. Id. at 843. A finding by the Court, for example, that Congress has clearly addressed
the issue is a finding that no deference to the agency was ever conferred on the question at
issue. Id. at 842.
[Vol. 44
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A more difficult situation arises when the precedent was issued
without the deference due under Chevron. For example, if the Court,
prior to the issuance of Chevron, definitively construed a statute under
an independent review standard16 and the agency later urges the Court
to take another look and this time to do it "right,"'1 7 should the Court
apply Chevron or should it follow its pre-Chevron precedent? Here,
the values served by stare decisis directly conflict with the principles
underlying Chevron,5 and the question becomes whether Chevron
trumps stare decisis.' 9 While I conclude it does not, Chevron does
counsel against application of the "super strong" presumption of cor-
rectness usually afforded the Court's statutory construction decisions. 20
However, a stare decisis "exception" to Chevron has the potential
to swallow the rule. Accordingly, I suggest the Chevron review stand-
ard should apply to the agency's construction of the Court's precedents
as well as to the agency's construction of the statute it administers.21
Judicial interpretations of statutes in essence become part of the stat-
utory scheme, until overruled by the Court or Congress,2 and are
binding on the agency. Thus, if the Court's prior decision speaks in
clear and unambiguous terms to the precise issue at hand, the prior
decision should be controlling.2 But if the Court has not confronted
the precise issue or if its holding is ambiguous, then the Court should
uphold the agency's reasonable interpretation of the Court's prece-
16. See infra text accompanying note 33 for a discussion of the independent review standard.
17. In this sense, doing it "right" means reviewing the agency's interpretation under the
Chemron review standard.
18. Unlike the situations described previously, no deference to the agency has ever occurred
when the precedents issued under an independent review standard. Thus, application of the
precedent to foreclose the agency's interpretation appears to be at odds with Chevron's view
that silent or ambiguous statutes imply a congressional desire that the agency, not the Court,
resolve the policy question. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
19. Precedent is not "sacrosanct"; given a strong enough justification for overruling its
precedent, the Court will not hesitate to do so. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 172 (1989). Indeed, the Court has recently been criticized for too readily overruling its
precedents. See Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REV. 177, 182-87 (1991).
20. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
21. While the Court, in Chevron, determined that courts generally should defer to agency
interpretations of statutes, it has not squarely confronted whether to defer to agency interpre-
tations of the Court's precedents construing statutes. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
22. See Earl Maltz, The Ndture of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 392 (1988) (defining
judicial interpretation of a statute as "the final and necessary step in the legislative process").
23. This parallels the Chevron rule that if the statute speaks directly to the precise issue
in question, the statute is controlling. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
HeinOnline  -- 44 Fla. L. Rev. 727 1992
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
dent.4 This approach reconciles the values of stability, predictability,
and rule of law underlying stare decisiss with the advantages of flex-
ibility and political accountability underlying Chevron.26
In addressing this problem, I focus on Supreme Court review of
the decisions of a particular agency, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). I do so for several reasons. First, review of NLRB
decisions presents a particularly strong case for application of Chevron
deference.Y Second, there is a body of Supreme Court precedent con-
struing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), much of it issued
without regard to Chevron deference principles.?s Third, the Supreme
Court's most recent review of an NLRB decision, Lechmere v. NLRB,29
raises the problem explored in this article and illustrates the need for
a thoughtful resolution of the conflict between judicial precedent and
agency discretion. Without a coherent approach, application of stare
decisis becomes simply a vehicle for judicial displacement of agency
24. This parallels the Chevron rule that the court will defer to the agency's construction
of a silent or ambiguous statute, even if that is not the interpretation the Court itself would
have chosen. Id. at 843, n.11; see Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 2074.
25. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 563-64 (1991); see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (discussing the benefits of stare decisis).
26. See infra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
27. Chevron has been criticized as being too broad since it presumably applies to review
of decisions of all administrative agencies. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions
of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 466-69 (1987). Chevron's strength as an interpretive
principle arguably could depend on the likelihood that Congress actually intended to confer
policymaking authority on a particular agency. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. It
is likely Congress intended to confer such authority on the NLRB. See infra notes 87-98 and
accompanying text.
28. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), has been in existence
in some form since 1935, yet Chevron was not decided until 1984. Throughout this 50 year
period, the Court often took a nondeferential approach. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965);
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105 (1956). Moreover, the Court often has been criticized for substituting its view of
the statute for the NLRB's. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 29:12 (2d ed. 1984); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor
Board and the Court, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 53, 73-74.
Additionally, the NLRB primarily uses adjudication, not rulemaking, to resolve statutory
questions. This use of adjudication to determine policy issues poses the conflict between Chevron
and stare decisis more directly and frequently than would a rulemaking approach.
29. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
(Vol. 44
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interpretations the Court dislikes, the antithesis of the Chevron stand-
ard of review.3
II. THE CHEVRON REVIEW STANDARD
A. Chevron as a Turning Point
Chevron marked a turning point in the Court's approach to judicial
review of agency lawmaldng.31 Prior to Chevron, two distinct ap-
proaches to judicial review of agency statutory interpretation existed
- the independent review model and the deferential review model.-
Under the independent review model, the Court would undertake its
own, independent search for statutory meaning, considering the
agency's viewpoint as merely a factor to be considered.3 Under the
deferential review model, illustrated by NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc.,4 the Court's role was limited to determining whether the
agency's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.w If so, it was
entitled to deference. 6
30. The Lechmere decision already has been criticized asjudicial policymaking. Robert.A.
Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 16 (1991). Gorman states:
It appears, given its failure to defer to the Board in Lechmere, that the Court's
attachment to the Chevron doctrine - a congenial doctrine for a Court committed
to 'Judicial restraint" - waxes and wanes, depending less upon the Court's iden-
tification of statutory ambiguity than upon its approval or its dislike of the principle
endorsed by the agency in the case under review.
Id.
Whether the Court acted correctly in refusing to defer to the NLRB in Lechmere is discussed
infra notes 208-27 and accompanying text.
31. Chevron's groundbreaking status has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Clark Byse,
Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step
Two, 2 ADMiN. L.J. 255, 255 (1988); Farina, supra note 2, at 456-57; Merrill, supra note 2, at
971; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2074-75.
32. For a discussion of the Court's divergent approaches to judicial review, prior to Chevron,
see, e.g., Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), affd sub
nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Breyer, supra note 27,
at 366-67; Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 764-70; Farina, supra note 2, at 453, 454; Scalia,
supra note 8, at 513.
33. See Farina, supra note 2, at 453-54, for a description of the independent review model.
For cases illustrating the Court's application of the independent review model, see, e.g., First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
34. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
35. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131; see NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983);
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 27, at 366, 371; Callahan, supra note 8, at 1279; Caust-El-
lenbogen, supra note 8, at 764-66; Kmiec, supra note 4, at 279; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury
and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28-30 (1983).
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In Chevron, the Court essentially endorsed the Hearst model. 7
Chevron involved review of an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) decision construing the term "source" in the Clean Air Act.s
The EPA had previously construed this term to mean any pollution-
emitting device within a plant3 However, in 1981, the EPA changed
its position, adopting a plant-wide definition of "source. ''40 The D.C.
Circuit rejected the EPA's definition, substituting its own interpreta-
tion of "source" for that of the agency. 41 The Supreme Court reversed.-
In reversing, the Court set forth a two-step approach to judicial
review of agency lawmaking. 4 First, the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the statute speaks directly to the precise issue in ques-
tion.- If so, the clear statutory meaning must control. 45 In Chevron,
the Court found Congress had not addressed whether a "source" was
the plant itself or each pollution emitting device within the plant.46
Thus, because Congress had not "directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue," the agency's interpretation could not be rejected at
step one. 47
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see Farina, supra note 2, at 455. Although the Court in
Chevron applied a deferential review model, its grounds for doing so extend beyond the reasoning
advanced in Hearst. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 862-66.
38. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839.
39. Id. at 857-59.
40. Id.
41. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
42. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
43. Id. at 842-43; see also Pierce, supra note 4, at 305 (discussing the two-step approach
of Chevron); Kenneth W. Starr, et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conser-
vative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 353 (1987) (same).
44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243. But cf. Merrill, supra note 2, at 990 (arguing the Court
has shifted from a "specific intent" to a "plain meaning" approach at step one, giving the Court
more latitude to "say what the law is").
45. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In determining whether a clear meaning is present, the
Court remains free to use the 'traditional tools of statutory construction," including canons of
construction and legislative history. Id. at 843 n.9; see Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers
and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J.
671, 681 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2096, 2110; Rebecca Hanner White, The Statutory
and Constitutional Limits of Using Protected Speech as Evidence of Unlawful Motive Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1992).
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 860-61.
47. Id. at 842.
[Vol. 44
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The Court then explained the second step of its inquiry.4 At this
step, the agency's interpretation of a silent or ambiguous statute must
be accepted by the reviewing court if the agency's position "is based
on a permissible construction of the statute."49 In other words, if
Congress has not specifically addressed the question at issue, the
agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute will control. Because
the EPA's plant-wide definition of "source" was a reasonable reading
of the statute, the agency's interpretation was upheld.5'
Chevron's deferential approach to agency lawmaking was not novel.
This approach had been occasionally relied upon since the days of
Hearst.2 Nonetheless, Chevron has become celebrated as one of the
most important administrative law decisions in recent years.5 It has
also become the leading case on questions of judicial deference to
_ agency lawmaldng . 4 Chevron's preeminence derives not only from its
two-step model for review of agency interpretations but from its
analysis of why such a model is appropriate. 5
First, Chevron recognized that interpretation of silent or ambigu-
ous statutes involves making policy choices.r Such policy choices, the
Court said, are better made by branches of government that are
48. Id. at 843.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 843-44; see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2074 ("The Chevron principle means that
in the face of ambiguity, agency interpretations will prevail so long as they are 'reasonable."').
51. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
52. While Hearst has been credited with '"oreshadowing" Chevron, Kmiec, supra note 4,
at 279, Hearst also has been described as less sweeping than Chevron, because it was based
on an "express delegation" to the NLRB, id., and because it involved a mixed question of law
and fact, instead of a pure question of statutory construction, Breyer, supra note 27, at 371.
See also Farina, supra note 2, at 456-57 ("Chevron defined deference in a way that, while not
entirely unprecedented, was far more extreme than earlier articulations of the model had been.").
53. Starr, supra note 2, at 284. Judge Starr has described the Chevron decision as "both
evolutionary and revolutionary." Id.
54. See Byse, supra note 31, at 255 ("In Chevron, the Supreme Court crafted a model or
paradigm to govern the federal judiciary's review of administrative interpretations."); Ronald
M. Levin, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
353, 356 (1987) (describing Chevron as "the leading case" on questions of deference to adminis-
trative agencies); Pierce, supra note 4, at 302 ("[Chevron] has transformed dramatically the
approach taken by courts in reviewing agency interpretations of statutory provisions."); Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 2075 ("[Chevron] has established itself as one of the very few defining cases
in the last twenty years of American public law.").
55. See, e.g., Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 772-76; Merrill, supra note 2, at 976-78.
56. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-66; see Kmiec, supra note 4, at 280-81; Pierce, supra note 4,
at 305-07; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2086-88.
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politically accountable rather than by courts, which are not.57 Second,
the Court relied on this concept of political accountability to imply,
from silent or ambiguous statutes, a delegation of power from Congress
to administrative agencies to resolve such policy questions.58
Chevron's scope has been the object of considerable debate. 59 A
"strong" reading of Chevron has emerged as the dominant interpreta-
tion. 6° This reading applies Chevron to both "pure" questions of law
and mixed questions of law and fact l in decisions by all administrative
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. The Court stated,
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests,
but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.... While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices
- resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id.; see Byse, supra note 31, at 257; Kmiec, supra note 4, at 281; Pierce, supra note 4, at 307;
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2087-89.
58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. This implied delegation may be contrasted with an express
delegation of interpretive authority to the agency. In cases of express delegation, .deference to
rational agency views must occur so long as sufficient "standards" are present to guide the
agency. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 652-59 (1980); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
424-26 (1977); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2084-85. In practice, however, vague and imprecise
standards have been deemed sufficient, perhaps due to Congress' inability to be more precise
when delegating policymaking power to agencies. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitu-
tional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 474-98 (1985).
What Chevron did was to move beyond deference to express delegations with imprecise
standards and to presume silent or ambiguous statutes are implied delegations of interpretive
authority, also deserving of deference from the courts. See Kmiec, supra note 4, at 277; Merrill,
supra note 2, at 979; Scalia, supra note 8, at 516; Starr, supra note 2, at 310. This implied
delegation approach is in large measure what has made Chevron so important and so controv-
ersial. Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REv. 667, 678
(1991); Luneberg, supra note 4, at 246-47 (1988); Merrill, supra note 2, at 977.
59. See Breyer, supra note 27; Byse, supra note 31, at 260-61; Caust-Elienbogen, supra
note 8, at 772-76, 786-820; Farina, supra note 2, at 455-57, 460-61, 464-76; Merrill, supra note
2, at 993-1003; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 405, 445-46 (1989).
60. Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 761, n.22; Pierce, supra note 4, at 303; Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 2093-2105. But see Callaghan, supra note 8, at 1296 (viewing Chevron as a
self-imposed "prudential limitation" on the courts that supports a narrow reading of Chevron).
61. Some have argued Chevron should not apply when the agency is construing the words
of the statute, as opposed to filling in a statutory gap. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 27, at 371;
Byse, supra note 31, at 263-64; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 376-77, 466. The Court's opinion in
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) helped foster
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agencies with rulemaking or adjudicative power. 2 Despite criticism,
Chevron sets forth the review standard the Court now endorses, at
least as a general operating principle.6 At the same time, the post-
Chevron Court has sometimes rejected agency interpretations without
applying the Chevron framework. 6 Determining when, if ever, Chev-
ronws two-step analysis should be set aside, particularly on the basis
of stare decisis, requires further exploration of the reasoning underly-
ing Chevron.
B. The Underpinnings of Chevron
Despite some suggestions to the contrary, one may safely state
that the Court does.not regard the Chevron review standard as con-
stitutionally compelled.6 First, prior to Chevron, the Court assumed
this debate. But see NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 130 (1987). Professor
Sunstein's opinion on this issue appears to have shifted over several years to favor the "strong"
reading. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2094-96.
Others argue Chevron deference should not occur when the court disagrees with the agency's
admittedly reasonable reading of the statute. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 761 n.22.
62. Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 813. Even some "strong" readings of Chevron would
distinguish between an agency that has been given the power to administer a statute, through
rulemaking or adjudication, and one that has not. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2094; cf. Litton
Fin. Printing v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2223 (1991) (NLRB not entitled to deference in its
interpretation of collective bargaining agreement, but only to its interpretation of statute). But
see Diver, supra note 12, at 593-94 (arguing that while agencies that have been delegated
rulemaking or adjudicative power have a stronger argument for deference, agencies that lack
such authority, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, are still deserving of
deference).
63. Even when the Court is purporting to apply Chevron, however, it displaces the agency's
interpretation with some frequency, most commonly because the agency's interpretation is found
to be at odds with the statute's "plain meaning." See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494
U.S. 26, 43 (1990); Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989).
Determining whether a statute does speak clearly to the issue at hand has been called the
"primary battleground on which litigation over agency interpretations [will be] fought." Starr,
supra note 2, at 298; see Scalia, supra note 8, at 520-21. Professor Merrill has suggested the
Court in fact is using Chevro's step one as an opportunity to declare the law, despite Chevron's
"counter-Marbury" mandate. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 970.
64. See, e.g., Lechmere v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). See also Merrill, supra note 2, at 981-82
& app. (discussing cases that have rejected agency interpretations without applying Chevron).
65. See Farina, supra note 2, at 456 (reading Chevron as constitutionally based and criticizing
the Chevron approach); see also Callahan, supra note 8, at 1277 (contending Chevron has been
interpreted as being constitutionally compelled and then taking issue with that contention). But
see Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 790-813 (contending that Chevron is unconstitutional in
that it violates separation of powers principles).
73
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without difficulty that nondeferential review was constitutionally per-
missible and appropriate.6 Second, in Chevron itself, the Court jus-
tified deferential review, not as a constitutional imperative, but as
the more appropriate reading of congressional intent.67 Finally, even
after Chevron, the Court has had no difficulty departing from a defe-
rential review model.6 It is therefore clear that the Court perceives
the Chevron rule as subconstitutional, rather than constitutional, in
nature.
69
In essence, Chevron adopted, as a norm of statutory construction,
a view that silent or ambiguous statutes imply a delegation by Con-
gress to the administrative agency to resolve the resulting policy
choices Congress itself left unresolved. 70 This implied delegation has
But Chevron, while not constitutionally required, is constitutional. Broad delegation to agen-
cies of authority to implement statutes has been established as constitutional. Therefore, the
delegation of interpretative power necessary for the statute's implementation also should be
seen as lawful. See Diver, supra note 12, at 569; Farber, supra note 58, at 677-78; Monaghan,
supra note 36, at 27-28; Pierce, supra note 58, at 496 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2084
n.64; see also Kmiec, supra note 4, at 286 ("If expansively worded delegations of legislative
authority are permissible, interpretations made in pursuit of that authority merit juidical defer-
ence.").
66. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
67. See 467 U.S. at 842-43; Scalia, supra note 8, at 516.
68. See cases cited supra note 64; see also Callahan, supra note 8, at 1294-95 (relying on
the Court's flexible application of Chevron as an indicator that it does not view Chevron as
being constitutionally required).
69. Even Chevron's strongest supporters do not argue that the Chevron two-step approach
is constitutionally compelled. Rather, they contend it is theoretically sound, as well as a pragmatic
exercise in judicial self-restraint. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 12, at 599 (advocating a strong
deferential approach, without discussion of Chevron); Kmiec, supra note 4, at 281; Pierce, supra
note 4, at 307-08; Starr, supra note 2, at 308-09; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). See also Scalia, supra note 8, at 516 (arguing
the deferential model is based on congressional intent).
70. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2094 (positing that Chevron is best viewed as an interpre-
tive principle designed to determine congressional intent); see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 516
(referring to Chevron as establishing a presumption of congressional intent to delegate law
interpreting authority). As an interpretive principle or presumption designed to determine con-
gressional intent, Chevron thus can be overcome by the absence of an intent to delegate.
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2094.
In contrast, Professor Callahan views Chevron as a prudential limitation self-imposed by the
Court, similar to the doctrine of abstention. Callahan, supra note 8, at 1277. Under her view,
the Court may refuse to defer under Chevron when it finds deference inappropriate. Id. at
1294; see also Luneberg, supra note 4, at 252 (arguing that in some cases courts, not Congress,
may decide whether to accept an agency interpretation).
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been characterized as a fiction, 71 as Congress more often than not
never considered the precise issue in question or whether to delegate
its resolution to the agency.2 But a "fictional" basis for an interpretive
norm does not invalidate the norm.73 Rather, as a general principle
of statutory construction, Chevron represents the Court's best guess
as to who Congress intended should resolve statutory ambiguities or
silences2 4 Moreover, Congress now knows that when it enacts ambigu-
ous or broadly drafted statutes, it is the agency, not the courts, that
in most instances will supply the statute's meaning or fill in the holes.75
As an interpretive norm, there is much to be said in favor of
Chevron.76 The decision allocates to a politically responsive branch the
making of what often are crucial policy decisions. 77 Although adminis-
trative agencies are less politically accountable than Congress, they
71. Scalia, supra note 8, at 517 ("[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a
fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law against which
Congress can legislate."); see also Breyer, supra note 27, at 370 (arguing that while courts
claim to examine legislative intent in determining deference to agencies, courts actually defer
when circumstances suggest it would be best); Merrill, supra note 2, at 979 (stating Chevron's
assertion that Congress expressly delegated statutory gaps or ambiguities to agencies is a legal
fiction).
72. See sources cited supra note 71; see also Callahan, supra note -8, at 1284. Professor
Callahan notes Justice Scalla's position and agrees that "[c]ommon sense tells us that in many
instances no intent either way can be discerned because Congress did not consider the matter
at all." Id. Professor Callahan, however, disagrees with viewing Chevron as being based on an
inferred congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority. Id. at 1285. She asserts that
because all statutes are inherently ambiguous, Congress may in fact have expected the courts
to interpret the statute. Id. Thus, a congressional delegation of final interpretive authority to
agencies would be constitutionally suspect. Id.
73. Chevron operates as an interpretive principle when an express delegation is absent.
See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977). When an express delegation is present,
there is no need to infer congressional intent; Congress has told the Court to defer to the
agency, and the Court will defer to the agency's construction, so long as it is not arbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 425-26.
74. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2076. Moreover, as Professor Sunstein notes, "even if
the Chevron principle is not accurate in every case, it is perhaps as accurate as any bright-line
alternative, and it therefore has the significant virtue of combining a fair degree of accuracy
with a reasonably clear rule." Id. at 2091.
75. Scalia, supra note 8, at 517; see also KIniec, supra note 4, at 282 (arguing Congress
will adopt a more cautious drafting approach knowing that agencies will interpret statutes).
76. For defenses of the Chevron rile, see Kmiec, supra note 4, at 281; Pierce, supra note
4, at 307-08.
77. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; see also Pierce,
supra note 4, at 305 ("When a court 'interprets' imprecise, ambiguous, or conflicting statutory
language in a particular manner, the court is resolving a policy issue.'.
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are more accountable to the electorate than are the courts.78 Even
the "independent" agencies, such as the NLRB, have proved them-
selves, over time, to be politically responsive. 79
Entrusting statutory interpretation to the agencies, moreover, pro-
motes flexibility.80 Unlike courts, agencies are not traditionally bound
by their own prior decisions on statutory meaning.sl Furthermore,
position switches attributable to changes in administrations reflect the
political accountability hailed by the Chevron Court.s
78. Moreover, Chevron may encourage more congressional involvement in policy decisions.
See Kmiec, supra note 4, at 282 (suggesting Congress may be more willing to reverse agency
decisions it disapproves than decisions by the judicial branch); Starr, supra note 2, at 311
(arguing Chevron may lead Congress to legislate more carefully if it wants to curb agency power).
79. An independent agency is one whose decisions are not subject to review by either the
President or a Cabinet Secretary and whose members are appointed by the President to fixed
terms. See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM.
J. POL. ScI. 197, 198 (1982). In discussing the NLRB, for example, Professor Moe observes,
after reviewing NLRB decisions over a number of years, "the decisional balance does seem to
change systematically across administrations, and in the expected direction." Id. at 211; see also
Winter, supra note 28, at 54. Winter notes NLRB policy has been affected by shifts in political
power. "Board members, unlike federal judges, are not well insulated from the swings of the
political process. Since their appointment is for only five years, they seem exceptionally subject
to the process and deliberately so." Id. See generally David L. Gregory, Proposals to Harmonize
Labor Law Jurisprudence and to Reconcile Political Tensions, 65 NEB. L. REv. 75, 89-92 (1985)
(noting the NLRB's responsiveness to changes in the political climate and the presidency). But
see Merrill, supra note 2, at 1011 (arguing the decisions of independent agencies should be given
less deference by the courts).
80. T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Updating Statutory Interpretations, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 43
(1988) ("Current policy considerations rather than 'original intent of the legislature,' is likely to
guide agency interpretations of statutes. Pleasing a sitting President and a sitting Congress is
going to keep an agency funded and out of trouble."); Diver, supra note 12, at 580 ("When a
legislature entrusts implementation of a statute to an agency ... it insures that the 'deal' will
remain flexible and adaptive to changing political fashions."); see also Byse, supra note 31, at
259; Pierce, supra note 4, at 313; Scalia, supra note 8, at 517-19; Starr, supra note 2, at 297;
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2103.
81. Chevron, for example, involved the EPA's changed interpretation of a statutory term.
See NLRB v. Curtin-Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (stating a NLRB rule is
entitled to deference even if it represents a departure from the NLRB's prior policy); David
L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 947 (1965).
82. As noted by Professor Sunstein:
Under Chevron, agency views receive deference not because they capture a unitary
intended meaning, but because the resolution of statutory ambiguities should be
undertaken by accountable, specialized administrators, not by courts. Under this
approach, it matters relatively little whether the agency decision is longstanding
and consistent or not. Regulatory shifts from one administration to another should
be entirely expected and indeed welcomed as a healthy part of democratic self-gov-
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In addition, agencies, charged with overseeing the implementation
and administration of a statute on a day-to-day basis, should have a
more expert view of how a particular interpretation will fit into the
entire statutory scheme. Finally, judicial deference by circuit courts
to an agency's reasonable reading of a statute promotes national unifor-
mity. 4
But the degree to which the Chevron two-step approach makes
sense as an interpretive principle depends upon the actual presence
of the above-described advantages in the context of a given agency
and its enabling act. 5 In other words, judicial deference to agency
lawmaking may be more defensible vis-A-vis some agencies than
others. 16 Assuming this is true, the potential conflict between Chevron
ernment or as a recognition of changed circumstances. So long as the statute is
ambiguous, those shifts reflect legitimate changes of policy.
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2103. Professor Sunstein adds, however, that perhaps agency depar-
tures from past interpretations should receive "somewhat less deference." Id.
83. The agency expertise argument has figured prominently in discussions of deferential
review. See Byse, supra note 31, at 258; Diver, supra note 12, at 591; Starr, supra note 2, at
309-10; Strauss, supra note 69, at 1115; Winter, supra note 28, at 58. But see Scalia, supra
note 8, at 514 ([Alsserting that agency expertise means the agency is 'more likely than the
courts to reach the correct result. That is, if true, a good practical reason for accepting the
agency's views, but hardly a valid theoretical justification for doing so.").
84. Deference leaves less room for circuit courts to displace an agency's nationwide ruling,
thereby helping to attain uniformity. Byse, supra note 31, at 259, 260; Pierce, supra note 4,
at 313; Strauss, supra note 69, at 1121.
85. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2085-2105. Professor Sunstein reasons that because
Chevron is best understood as a reconstruction of congressional intent, Chevron deference should
depend on the likelihood that Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency. Id. He
contends, for example, that when an agency has not been given authority to implement a statute,
it is unlikely Congress intended to give the agency law-interpreting authority, and vice versa. Id.
In an earlier article, Professor Sunstein argued that whether Chevron deference was appro-
priate should depend on whether the issue in question was one of policy. In other words, he
would find deference more appropriate when the agency was filling in a gap, than when it was
construing a statutory term. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 466-67. The broader and vaguer the
statute, the more likely Congress intended the agency to make the interpretation.
Professor Callahan, who views Chevron as a prudential limitation, argues Chevron should
apply only "where the interpretive task involves the weighing of competing policy concerns,
the statute is technical and complex, and the agency has engaged in a lengthy and detailed
decisionmaking process of its own," or when the Court otherwise finds an "implicit delegation
of policymaking authority to an agency." Callahan, supra note 8, at 1295. See also Breyer,
supra note 27, at 373 (criticizing the interpretation of Chevron as "laying down a blanket rule,
applicable to all agency interpretations of law" and contending such interpretation would be
"seriously overboard, counterproductive and sometimes senseless").
86. For example, it is more reasonable to find Congress intended to confer law-interpreting
authority on an agency to which it confided the administration and enforcement of a broadly-
worded statute. Having made the 'Tirst-level" policy decision to regulate in a particular area,
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and other interpretive principles is at its highest when the Court
reviews the decision of an agency particularly deserving of Chevron
deference.
The NLRB is such an agency. The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),8 which regulates the law of collective bargaining and other
forms of concerted activity in the private sector, is a broadly drafted,
frequently ambiguous statute that addresses fundamental policy con-
cerns.ss Through the NLRA, Congress has made the determination
that concerted activities are deserving of protection, but the paramet-
ers of that protection are strikingly amorphous.- In determining
whether certain acts are protected, unprotected or prohibited by the
NLRA, the NLRB frequently must strike a balance among competing
interests and policy concerns.9 Most people, moreover, have very
specific ideas about how that balance should be struck; few would
disagree that "labor law is a field in which strong convictions hold
sway."91 When the policy choices presented are controversial as well
as fundamental, the need for political accountability is particularly
strong.9
it has left to agencies the "second- or third-level policy decisions" that must be made in order
to implement the first-level policy choice. See Pierce, supra note 58, at 496-97 (1985).
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
88. Since its inception in 1935, the breadth and vagueness of the NLRA has been a frequent
subject of the Court's and commentators' remarks. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) (recognizing the need for the NLRB's "authority to... fill the interstices
of the broad statutory provisions"); Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB,
6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 95-96 (1955); Winter, supra note 28, at 57.
89. See Winter, supra note 28, at 56-57. An example of the NLRA's ambiguity is the extent
to which "an employer, without transgressing the commands of [section 8(a)(1)], [may] prohibit
union solicitation on his property," a question Professor Winter suggests Congress most likely
never considered. Id.
90. See Summers, supra note 88, at 97-98; Winter, supra note 28, at 56-58. Winter argues:
[I]n none of [the cases posing questions for which the statute provides no clear
answers] are the purposes unidirectional. In each instance, the problem can be
resolved only by weighing the different purposes and by subordinating some in
favor of others. The act, therefore, at least in its unelaborated, pristine condition,
presents herculean problems of statutory interpretation.
Id. at 58.
91. Robert S. Vance, A View from the Circuit: A Federal Circuit Judge Views the NLRA
Appellate Scene, 1 LAB. LAw. 39, 40 (1985).
92. See Winter, supra note 28, at 58-59 (stating "[t]o many, an agency responsive in part
to the political process and not required always to base its decisions on generalized principles
is better suited to the task of 'fleshing out' such legislation"); see also Gregory, supra note 79,
at 91-92.
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Congress created the NLRB to administer and enforce the NLRA
against a backdrop of hostility toward judicially-created labor policy.93
The broadly worded statute and its anti-judicial origins support an
implied delegation of law interpreting authority to the NLRB.Y Thus,
in the NLRB context, the Chevron "fiction" that Congress intended
the agency, rather than the courts, to resolve statutory ambiguities
appears grounded in fact.
In addition, interpretation of the statute by an agency with the
ability to change its mind is important. Congress has proven relatively
incapable of amending the NLRA, given the political sensitivity of
the NLRA's subject matter.95 The broad wording and significant gaps
in the NLRA, however, have allowed the United States' labor policy
to change over time, often in response to changes in administrations.9
Furthermore, interpretation by an agency charged with the day-to-
day administration and enforcement of the statute helps ensure that
the NLRA operates as a coherent whole.Y Requiring deference by
93. The NLRB's creation may be attributed to congressional displeasure with the courts'
handiwork on labor relations matters. Winter, supra note 28, at 59 n.5. See generally Rebecca
Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of
the Circuit" when Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69
N.C. L. REv. 639, 651-52 (1991) (discussing this point and collecting relevant authorities).
94. Winter, supra note 28, at 58. Winter notes that "[tihe quality and quantity of ambiguities
in the act - amounting in effect to a broad delegation of authority - were so great that it
was perfectly sensible to leave initial adjudication to a single tribunal." Id. Writing two decades
before Chevron, Winter outlines the reasons why the Court should defer to the NLRB and
criticizes the Court for its frequent lack of deference. Professor Winter goes so far as to suggest
the Court's failure to defer to the NLRB "may raise a serious issue of separation of powers,"
apparently based on his view that Congress' delegation of lawmaking authority to the NLRB
is tantamount to an express delegation, for the reasons set forth above. Id. at 74.
While I do not contend Congress has expressly delegated interpretive power to the NLRB,
the NLRA's breadth, ambiguity and historical background lend strong support to Chevron's
interpretive approach when reviewing decisions of the NLRB.
95. Gregory, supra note 79, at 91; Winter, supra note 28, at 65. Illustrative are recent
attempts to amend the NLRA to prohibit employment of permanent replacements during
economic strikes. See H.R. 4552, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. 3125 (May 10, 1988).
96. Gregory, supra note 79, at 89-92; Moe, supra note 79, at 210-11; Winter, supra note
28, at 63-67 (stating this flexibility is premised on the agency's "relative freedom from the
docrtine of stare decisis").
97. See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 603, 619 (1989); Strauss, supra note
65, at 1115; White, supra note 93, at 675-78; Winter, supra note 29, at 58.
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the lower courts to NLRB decisions promotes uniformity of national
labor policy by reducing the likelihood that the agency's nationwide
rule will be overturned by a particular circuit court.
These considerations suggest that there are agency decisions, in-
cluding those by the NLRB, that are particularly appealing candidates
for Chevron deference, decisions that illustrate why the Chevron de-
ference principle makes particular sense as an interpretive norm. But
as an interpretive principle, not a constitutionally required review
standard, there can be times when Chevron's two-step analysis points
in the direction of deference while other norms point in favor of setting
the agency's interpretation aside.9
In an important recent article, Professor Cass Sunstein addresses
the intersection of Chevron and various other interpretive norms.9
His general conclusion is that whether Chevron or a competing prin-
ciple will triumph depends upon the function served by the competing
norm.1- For example, in his view Chevron does not override norms
designed to ascertain legislative intent or that require a clear legisla-
tive statement.101 On the other hand, Chevron does trump interpretive
norms designed to promote rationality or to achieve "just" results. '
An issue not addressed by Professor Sunstein is the proper recon-
ciliation of Chevron's deference principle and the rule of stare decisis. 10
98. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,
494 U.S. 638 (1990); Edward J. DeBartalo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Const. Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Counsel, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
99. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2105-20.
100. Id.
101. Id. Professor Sunstein concludes, for example, that syntactic norms and interpretive
instructions, designed to ascertain congressional intent, usually will triumph over Chevron. He
further suggests that principles requiring a clear legislative statement overcome Chevron.
102. Id. Norms designed to correct "absurd or unjust results" do not overcome Chevron,
because, what is "absurd" or "unjust" often depends on one's point of view. Id. at 2109-20.
Whether or not Professor Sunstein is correct on each intersection he discusses, he makes a
sound point that Chevron deference should not occur when it is unlikely Congress intended the
courts to defer.
See also Callahan, supra note 8, at 1299 (recognizing that after Chevron, the question becomes
"whether Chevron's preference for political decisionmakers in the resolution of hard policy
questions is overcome under given circumstances. Chevron thus provides a baseline against
which judicial decisions to defer or not to defer to agency interpretations are now measured.").
103. However, Professor Sunstein does discuss the role of stare decisis in determining the
reach of Chevron. Id. at 2102-04.
Moreover, while this article was in press, the following student commentary appeared on
this topic: Susan K. Goplen, Note, Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal Interpre-
(Vol. 44
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But this particular conflict is likely to occur with considerable fre-
quency.
Stare decisis is itself an interpretive principle. 1°4 When asked to
construe a statute it has construed before, the Court often will rely
on precedent to resolve the interpretive issue.1 5 When the Court's
precedent conflicts with the agency's reading of the statute, when, if
ever, should Chevron's deference principle apply? The remainder of
this article considers this question.
III. DETERMINING WHEN A "TRUE CONFLICT" BETWEEN
CHEVRON AND STARE DECISIS IS PRESENT
As set forth above, Chevron generally commands the Court to
defer to an agency's construction of a silent or ambiguous statute.
When the Court is confronted with a clean slate - the agency's present
interpretation of the statute and no other - no conflict with stare
decisis exists. But when the agency's present interpretation conflicts
with either past agency or judicial interpretations of the statute, one
must consider what weight, if any, the prior interpretation should be
given.
Cases involving prior agency interpretations present little difficul-
ty. If the flexibility and political accountability underlying Chevron
are to be realized, agencies must be free from the constraints of
tations After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1993); Johan Sharifi, Note,
Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by Federal Agencies After the Chevron Decision:
What Gives?, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 223 (1993).
104. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 404 (1949-50) (citing
as a canon of construction that "[a]fter enactment, judicial decision upon interpretation of par-
ticular terms and phrases controls"). Interestingly, he posits as the countervailing canon that
"[p]ractical construction by executive officers is strong evidence of true meaning." Id.
While Llewellyn's point was that canons of construction are so contradictory as to be mean-
ingless, the crucial question is which opposing canon should control. Professor Sunstein counters
Llewellyn's point and asserts "[i]n the face of ambiguity, outcomes must turn on interpretive
principles of various sorts; there is simply no other way to decide hard cases." Sunstein, supra
note 3, at 2106 (noting and criticizing Llewellyn's dismissal of interpretive principles).
105. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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intra-agency stare decisis.1°0 A change in interpretation in response
to a change in administrations, moreover, does not deprive the new
interpretation of the deference to which it otherwise would be enti-
tled. 1 Despite periodic suggestions from the Court to the contrary,1°8
Chevron commands that the agency be free to change its mind without
sacrificing judicial deference to its changed position.' °0
When the prior interpretation has been ruled upon by a reviewing
court, however, the question becomes more difficult. Consider an
agency interpretation approved by a reviewing court as a reasonable
interpretation of the governing statute. If the agency thereafter
changes its interpretation, should the court's prior decision preclude
the court from deferring to the agency's new position?
106. Unlike courts, agencies traditionally have not considered themselves bound by stare
decisis at the agency level. See, e.g., Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982);
General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978); Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977); Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); Shapiro, supra note
81, at 947. The lack of agency stare decisis has been relied upon to support a deferential review
model because it allows national policy to change over time without the need for congressional
action. See Byse, supra note 31, at 257, 259; Marianne Koral Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule
Recissions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1928, 1934 (1984). Moreover, "[t]he more open-ended or ambigu-
ous the delegating language the more free the agency should be to change policy in accordance
with administrative preference." Id. at 1964.
Commenting specifically on the NLRB, Professor Winter has stated:
If the Labor Board is to be able to experiment with different rules and to respond
to changes in the political climate, it must be permitted to overrule prior doctrine
within the area of discretion permitted by the statute and in the light of its
experience as a specialized agency. And this means that the courts must not require
strict adherence by the agency to the doctrine of stare decisis but must permit it
to vary principles of general application within the confines outlined above.
Winter, supra note 28, at 71.
107. "This theory holds that the Board should be free, after shifts in political power, to
reverse prior decisions, not simply because they have been found to be inadequate through
experience, but because the 'new' Board gives different weights to the various conflicting pur-
poses of the statute." Winter, supra note 28, at 64; see Pierce, supra note 4, at 313; Starr,
supra note 2, at 297-98; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2103.
108. See sources cited in Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2102 n.142.
109. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (developing the two-step approach despite the EPA's
change in position following a change in administrations); NLRB v. Curtin-Matheson Scientific,
Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (deferring to NLRB's refusal to adopt a presumption that strike
replacements oppose the union, even though NLRB's position represented a change in approach).
For commentary on this point, see Aleinkoff, supra note 80, at 45 n.109; Scalia, supra note 8,
at 517; cf. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2101-04 (recognizing agencies must be permitted the
freedom to change their interpretations without losing their entitlement to deference but contend-
ing that an agency's departure from longstanding interpretations should receive "somewhat less
deference" from the courts).
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Here again, Chevron's logic commands that deference to the agency
occur. In this situation, the court's prior decision would have upheld
the agency's past interpretation as one reasonable reading of the stat-
ute, not the only one. Implicit in any such decision is the conclusion
that other reasonable, and thus permissible, interpretations are avail-
able.110 Accordingly, the agency's decision to adopt a different reason-
able interpretation would not conflict with the court's prior decision.-"'
Moreover, the values underlying Chevron demand that the agency be
free to shift from one reasonable reading to another. 12 Because the
precedent has approved only one reasonable reading, without exclud-
ing others, no true conflict with the precedent actually exists. Because
there is no conflict between stare decisis and Chevron deference, Chev-
ron deference should occur.
Chevron itself illustrates this point. In Chevron, the D.C. Circuit
had refused to approve the EPA's changed construction of "source,"
when the new definition conflicted with circuit precedent interpreting
the statute differently. 113 The Court reversed the lower court for failing
to defer to the agency, citing the need for flexibility and the benefits
of political accountability. n 4 While the circuit previously had found
another reading to be reasonable, but not statutorily mandated, the
Court held this was not a sufficient basis on which to reject the
agency's revised position.
What happens, however, when the Supreme Court has upheld the
agency's old interpretation as the only possible interpretation of the
110. Diver, supra note 12, at 587 ("Judicial approval of a contested interpretation as merely
'reasonable,' ... implies that alternative meanings could also lie within the bounds of reason.").
111. See NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1990); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v.
Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 877 (1990); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1989);
Diver, supra note 12, at 587; White, supra note 93, at 675.
For criticism of the Mesa Verde decision, see Ursula M. McDonnell, Comment, Deference
to N.L.R.B. Adjudicatory Decision Making: Has Judicial Review Become Meaningless?, 58 U.
OiN. L. REv. 653, 674-80 (1989).
112. See sources cited supra note 111.
113. National Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). The D.C. Circuit had rejected the agency's construction in favor of its own, despite its
express recognition that Congress had not explicitly intended the court's construction. Id. at
723. The Supreme Court found the lower court had erred in applying its own construction "when
[the court] had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842; see Merrill, supra note 2, at 989.
114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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statute? When the agency thereafter changes its mind, does Chevron
command deference to the agency's new position? The Court has cor-
rectly said that it does not. As stated by the Court in Maislin Indus-
tries, United States, Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,",' "Once we have
determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later
interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the
statute's meaning. '1116
In Maislin, the Court rejected the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's (ICC) determination that an independently negotiated rate re-
lieved a shipper of the duty to pay the filed rate. 117 The Maislin Court
found the ICC's position inconsistent with the "filed rate doctrine"
previously accepted by the ICC and approved by the Court."8 Under
the filed rate doctrine, a shipper must pay the filed rate unless the
ICC finds that rate to be unreasonable. 1 9 In rejecting the ICC's new
construction, the Court pointed out that its past decisions affirming
the ICC's filed rate doctrine had been based on the statute's clear
meaning. 20 In other words, using the language of Chevron's step one,
115. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
116. Id. at 131. Properly read, this language means only that an agency may not swerve
from an interpretation the Court has previously determined to be required by the statute. It
does not mean the agency cannot depart from a reading the Court has upheld as a permissible
one. For a similar reading of Maislin, see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2103; see also Diver,
supra note 12, at 587. But see Merrill, supra note 2, at 990 (contending Maislin precludes an
agency from disregarding Supreme Court precedent, without distinguishing between precedent
that upholds the agency's position as the only permissible reading and precedent that upholds
the agency's position as a permissible reading).
117. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 120-21.
118. Id. at 134-35.
119. Id. at 128.
120. The Court stated:
For a century, this Court has held that the Act, as it incorporates the filed rate
doctrine, forbids as discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates
lower than the filed rate. By refusing to order collection of the filed rate solely
because the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very
price discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prevent.
Id. at 130 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court made clear in Maislin its view that the filed rate
doctrine was not simply a permissible statutory interpretation but a doctrine mandated by the
statute's fixed and clear terms.
One, of course, could take issue with the Court's construction of both the statute and its
past decisions. See id. at 138-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Merrill, supra note 2, at 989; Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 2103 n. 149. But for present purposes, it matters less whether the Court reached
the correct result under Chevron's step one than that it had performed the step-one analysis
dictated by Chevron.
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the Court previously had found Congress to have addressed the precise
question at issue. Because Congress had not altered the statutory
language, the Court refused to revisit the issue, relying on stare
decisis to reject the agency's new construction.1
This reliance on stare decisis does no violence to Chevron. Under
Chevron's step one, the Court will examine a statute to determine
whether Congress has clearly spoken to the precise issue at hand.122
If it finds a clear and unambiguous congressional intent, the Court
gives effect to that intent, whether or not it is consistent with the
agency's position.m The finding that Congress has clearly addressed
the issue is a finding that Congress did not intend to confer interpretive
authority on the agency but instead itself resolved the policy choice. M
Thus, when the Court refuses to defer to the agency's changed posi-
tion, relying on its previous construction of the statute, it is not flouting
Chevron.m Rather, the Court's prior opinion had fully considered
whether deference was due under Chevron and concluded it was not.
121. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131. Of course, the Court remains free to reject its precedent if
it is persuaded by the agency that it should do so.
122. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
123. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 76 (1990);
Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
124. Professor Winter correctly recognized that such an interpretation by the Supreme
Court would bind the agency and urged the Court to be more mindful of its limited role in
reviewing NLRB determinations. Winter, supra note 28, at 72-73. Otherwise the Court's deci-
sions will frustrate the NLRB's ability to shift the statute's meaning in response to changed
circumstances. Id.
125. The same reasoning should follow when the Court previously has rejected an agency's
construction, either under Chevron's step one as inconsistent with the statute's plain meaning,
or under Chevron's step two as arbitrary and capricious, and the agency continues to press the
same construction before the Court. In rejecting the agency's view in its initial decision, the
Court has given the agency the benefit of any Chevron deference it was due.
In a prior article, I have urged a somewhat different approach for the circuit courts when
reviewing NLRB interpretations. See White, supra note 93. When a circuit court, using a
Chevron review standard, has rejected the NLRB's interpretation as irrational or has upheld
it as the only permissible reading of the statute, Chevron does not require the circuit to disregard
its precedent. Id. at 675 n.232. Nonetheless, because the primary benefits underlying the law
of the circuit doctrine frequently are not realized in NLRB cases, due to the broad venue
provisions governing judicial review of NLRB orders, I have suggested that circuit courts avoid
rigid adherence to circuit law. Id. at 671-84. The circuit should instead review the NLRB's
interpretation, even one at odds with circuit precedent, without regard to the precedent. Id.
But when it is a Supreme Court precedent at issue, the considerations are different, as the
NLRB itself has recognized. Id. at 644 n.25. There, the values of stare decisis are fully implicated.
When the prior decision gave the agency any Chevron deference it was due, no compelling
reason exists to ignore the policies underlying stare decisis. See Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131.
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Reliance on precedent in these circumstances poses no conflict with
Chevron deference, because the Court has found no deference to the
agency was intended.1H
More difficult, however, are cases where the Court's precedent
rejected the agency's view under an independent review model, with-
out regard to the policies underlying the Chevron interpretive princi-
ple. When the agency thereafter asks the Court to defer to the agency's
view, a true conflict between the values of stare decisis and Chevron
deference occurs.
IV. SHOULD STARE DECISIS DISPLACE CHEVRON?
Properly viewed, Chevron is a canon of statutory construction that
presumes Congress intended to confer on administrative agencies the
power to interpret statutory silences or ambiguities in their enabling
acts. 12 Stare decisis, in the context of statutory adjudication, also
operates as an interpretive norm. ' s When the Court interprets a stat-
ute, it tells Congress, and the rest of us, "this is what the statute
means." Stare decisis lets us know the meaning the statute will be
given in the future, absent a compelling reason for change.1-
126. But see Merrill, supra note 2, at 989-90, 1023 (contending Maislin is inconsistent with
Chevron). Professor Merrill contends the "logic" of Chevron would permit an agency to overrule
Supreme Court decisions. He argues Chevron should be replaced by an "executive precedent"
model, under which agency interpretations should be given the same respect one circuit court
gives to the decisions of a sister circuit. Id. at 990, 1003-13.
A problem with Professor Merrill's analysis is his failure to distinguish between Supreme
Court decisions upholding an agency's interpretation as permissible and those finding it to be
required. Chevron permits the agency to "depart" from the Court's precedent only in the former
situation, in essence because no real departure has occurred. See supra notes 109-12 and accom-
panying text. In these cases, the Court has upheld one agency view of the statute without
foreclosing others. When the agency thereafter changes course, it has not "overruled" a Supreme
Court decision; instead, it has overruled only its own precedent, something Chevron not only
permits but perhaps encourages. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 104; Maltz, supra note 22, at 367.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, judges are required to follow precedents, even those
with which they disagree, unless substantial reasons for departure exist. Id.
Stare decisis can be of two forms: vertical and horizontal. The vertical form requires lower
court judges to follow the precedents of courts above them. The horizontal form requires a
court to follow its own precedents. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 90 n.89 (1991). Because my focus is
on the Supreme Court's treatment of its own precedents, this article primarily involves the
horizontal form of stare decisis.
129. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 757 (1988) ("In the American common law, stare decisis states a conditional
obligation: precedent binds absent a showing of substantial countervailing considerations.").
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Stare decisis is not constitutionally required but instead is a judi-
cially crafted canon designed to effectuate important policies. 13° The
Court has recognized that stare decisis "is of fundamental importance
to the rule of law, ''131 finding it "indisputable that stare decisis is a
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is en-
trusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserv-
ing a jurisprudential system that is not based upon an arbitrary dis-
cretion."132
The values promoted by stare decisis are many. When followed by
the Supreme Court,' 33 stare decisis promotes consistency and coher-
ence in the law, as well as equity and fairness.134 In addition, it makes
the law predictable, enabling those governed to plan their affairs and
to structure their conduct, aware of the consequences of their acts.'3
It also reduces the workload of the Court.13 Moreover, stare decisis
serves to legitimatize the legal process, as well as the Court itself.137
130. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2797 (1992); see Eskridge, supra note
11, at 1361; Marshall, supra note 11, at 220; John P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made
Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1983) (describing stare decisis as "one of the oldest of judge-made
rules").
131. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987).
132. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
133. I draw a distinction here between horizontal stare decisis at the Supreme Court level
and horizontal stare decisis at the circuit court level (commonly referred to as "the law of the
circuit"), because circuit law may provide few of the benefits of stare decisis when the circuit
reviews administrative agency decisions. Some agencies, such as the NLRB, cannot know in
which circuit their decisions will be reviewed, given the broad venue provisions of their enabling
acts. See White, supra note 93. Thus, the law of any particular circuit is not available as a
source of certainty or predictability. Id.
Supreme Court decisions, however, are national in scope. Thus, the full benefits of stare
decisis are applicable when the high Court decides a case.
134. See J. DAVID MURPHY & ROBERT REUTER, STARE DECISIS IN COMMONWEALTH
APPELLATE COURTS 93-97 (1981); Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 76-90; Arthur D. Hellman,
Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989); Maltz, supra note 22, at 368-72; Monaghan, supra
note 129, at 744-47; Stevens, supra note 130, at 1.
135. See sources cited supra note 134.
136. BENJAmIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) ("[T]he
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation
of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.").
137. Stevens, supra note 130, at 2. As described by Justice Stevens,
Adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis also enhances the reputation of judges
and makes their work product more acceptable to the community at large. For a
rule that orders judges to decide like cases in the same way increases the likelihood
that judges will in fact administer justice impartially and that they will be perceived
to be doing so. This perception, which obviously enhances the institutional strength
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Stare decisis "supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifically
the belief that all organs of government, including the Court, are
bound by the law."'3
While the Court follows stare decisis in its constitutional and com-
mon law adjudications, it has developed what has been termed a "super
strong presumption of correctness" for its statutory precedents. 139 One
explanation for the heightened stare decisis effect given the Court's
statutory precedents "is that each judicial interpretation of a statute
is a building block upon which private parties, Congress, and the
Court itself build. ' 140 In essence, the Court's interpretation becomes
part of the statute, and for the Court to change its mind is akin to a
statutory amendment.14, Furthermore, Congress has the power to
overrule the Court's interpretation by amending the statute. This
power distinguishes statutory precedents from constitutional ones.'4
of the judiciary, is of greatest importance because of its stabilizing effect on the
private ordering of economic relationships and on the entire system of government.
Id.
138. Monaghan, supra note 129, at 752.
139. See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1362 (criticizing the "super strong presumption of
correctness" enjoyed by statutory precedents); see also Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1991) (commenting that stare decisis has special force in the area
of statutory interpretation because Congress is free to overrule the Court); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("We have said also that the burden borne by the party
advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked
to overrule a point of statutory construction.").
In contrast, an argument could be made that the Court's statutory decisions should have no
precedential effect at all, because it is the text of the statute that controls, not the case law
interpreting it. See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 365 (1985); see also Easterbrook, supra note 11 (criticizing the precedential weight
of the Court's statutory decisions).
140. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1043 (1989).
141. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1366; Maltz, supra note 22, at 392; Marshall, supra note
11, at 211.
142. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73 ("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in
the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done."); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation De-
cisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991). Professor Eskridge documents that Congress does
overrule Supreme Court decisions "with a frequency heretofore unreported." Id. He reports
that congressional overrides most frequently occur within two years of the Court's decision. Id.
at 345; see, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1224 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 2000e) (overruling and modifying
a number of employment discrimination decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in 1989).
Professor Marshall has relied on Congress' overruling power to urge an absolute rule of
stare decisis for the Court's statutory decisions. Marshall, supra note 11, at 208-15.
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In addition, Congress, as well as the public, may have relied on the
interpretation. Thus overruling the statute could "unsettle a vast clus-
ter of public and private expectations."'4
The Court interprets some statutes which have no agency respon-
sible for their administration and enforcement. For example, the Sher-
man Act is a broad and vague statute that has required the Court to
develop a body of governing law.44 But other similarly broad and
vague statutes, such as the NLRA, have agencies to whom Congress
has entrusted the statute's administration and enforcement. 145 When
the Court has interpreted those statutes under an independent review
model, as it did often in the pre-Chevron era, should the Court in the
post-Chevron era continue to afford those decisions a "super strong"
presumption of correctness? More ftndamentally, should the Court
afford those decisions any precedential effect at all?
One example of such precedent is NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co.' 46 At issue in Babcock was whether an employer committed an
unfair labor practice when it excluded union organizers from its private
property.1 47 The NLRB, relying on the Court's previous decision in
143. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1367; see Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Conm'n,
112 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1991). These reliance concerns, of cours-. are present in constitutional and
common law cases as well. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 2791, 2797 (1992).
2797 (1992).
144. See Eskridge, supra note 140, at 1052, 1054, 1401 (describing the Court's development
of the law under statutes such as the Sherman Act as evolutive in nature, because it is developed
on a case-by-case basis); see also Pierce, supra note 4, at 305 (distinguishing between the Court's
making of policy choices under statutes where no agency is involved, such as the Sherman Act,
and those where an agency is in the picture).
In applying stare decisis, the Court has not distinguished between decisions based on clear
statutory text and those based on interpretation of ambiguous statutes. The Court has stated
that "[a] rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous or
incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning
of a statute." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 112 (1989). The
question is whether the Court should make such distinctions when an administrative agency is
charged with enforcement of the statute.
145. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) (stating that broad
provisions of the NLRA require the NLRB to formulate specific administrative application);
White, supra note 93.
146. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
147. Id. at 107. In Babcock, organizers were seeking access to the employer's parking lot
in order to distribute union literature. Id. The plant, its parking lot, and driveway all were
located on the employer's privately-owned property, from which anyone distributing pamphlets
was routinely excluded. Id.
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Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 14s found the employer had no right
to exclude the organizers unless the employer's managerial interests
outweighed the interference with employees' rights to self-organization
provided by section 7 of the NLRA. 149 The NLRB applied to union
organizers the rule developed in Republic Aviation concerning acts
directed toward the employer's own employees. 150 The Supreme Court
reversed the NLRB decision, finding the NLRA drew a distinction
"of substance" between "employees" and "nonemployee" union organiz-
ers. Thus, the Court held the access rights of "nonemployees" must
be governed by a standard different than that for employees.151
Babcock illustrates the Court's use of an independent review model.
The NLRA is silent on questions of access to private property. Most
likely this is a question Congress never considered. 152 However, resol-
ving the access questions involves the balancing of important, and
opposing, interests.'- In rejecting the NLRB's resolution of this policy
issue, the Court made no effort to anchor in the language of the statute
its "distinction of substance" between employees of the employer in
148. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
149. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113. In Republic Aviation, the Court upheld the NLRB's deter-
mination that an employer commits an unfair labor practice when it prohibits its employees
from engaging in union solicitation on nonwork time. 324 U.S. at 805. In Babcock, the Court
described the Republic Aviation standard as stating that no restriction on organizational activities
may occur "unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain
production or discipline." Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113.
150. The NLRB had applied the same test to the organizers' request for access in Babcock
and had found access should be granted, because no interference with production or discipline
had been shown. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 494 (1954), affd sub nom. NLRB
v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105 (1956).
151. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113.
152. See Jay Gresham, Note, Still as Strangers: Nonemployee Union Organizers on Private
Commercial Property, 62 TEX. L. REV. 111, 119 (1983), which points out that Babcock "is
written in simple declarative form, as if the Court were merely restating well-established rules
of law or deferring to the express intent of Congress. In fact, Congress had not expressed its
intent concerning the issue before the Court," nor was there any legislative history on the
question. Id.; see also Winter, supra note 28, at 56-57 (referring to Congress' failure to foresee
the property access issues that would arise under the NLRA).
153. In short, access questions involve the balancing of an employer's property rights
against employees' rights under section 7 of the NLRA to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining. See Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 521-23 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544 (1972); Jean Country,
291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988).
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question and the "nonemployee" organizers. M' Nor could it have, for
no such distinction is found in the NLRA.1ss Because the NLRA does
not specifically address the precise issue in question, the NLRB's
position could not have been rejected under Chevron's step one.156 Had
the Court given the NLRB the deference it was due under Chevron's
step two, it is unlikely the NLRB's position would have been rejected
154. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112-13. At no place in the Babcock opinion does the Court cite
to any statutory language supporting, much less commanding, the distinction it makes.
155. If anything, the statutory language points in the opposite direction. The term "employ-
ee" is defined in the NLRA to include "any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1988). This expansive definition of the term "employee" was a result of the Court's prior
construction of the term to encompass only the employees of a particular employer. This narrow
construction led to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, any search for clear statutory
language to support the Court's "distinction of substance" between the employees of Babcock
& Wilcox and "nonemployees" fails. Presumably, the organizers in Babcock were employed by
someone, most likely the union, and thus would seem to be "employees" within the meaning of
the NLRA. Certainly, there is no statutory language supporting their exclusion. See JAMEs B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND AsSUmPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 61-62 (1983); see also
Gorman, supra note 30, at 11 (stating that Babcock may have incorrectly held that non-company
employees have no section 7 rights).
In addition, it is worth noting the NLRA contains no express protection for (or even any
discussion of) employers' property rights. ATLESON, supra, at 62; see also Gorman, supra note
30, at 11 (stating that the NLRA does not even mention property rights). Moreover, the language
of section 8(a)(1) is categorical: employers shall not interfere with employees' exercise of their
section 7 rights. Nonetheless, the NLRB and Court have each rejected a literal reading of the
statute, recognizing the need to soften the statutory prohibition. See ROBERT A. GORmAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 133 (1976).
My point here is not that Babcock was wrong but that it was not (and could not have been)
based on clear statutory language, within the meaning of Chevron's step one.
156. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 852 (1992) (White, J., dissenting).
However, the majority in Lechmere stated that "[bly reversing the Board's interpretation of
the statute for failing to distinguish between the organizing activities of employees and
nonemployees, we were saying, in Chevron terms, that § 7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee
access to an employer's property." Id. at 848. Cf. Gorman, supra note 30, at 15 (terming the
Court's description of Babcock "mind boggling").
Lechmere involved the question of when an employer lawfully could exclude union organizers
from property open to the public. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 884. The NLRB had adopted a
balancing test for resolving this issue in Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14, and had applied
it in Lechmere to order that access be granted. Lechmere v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 143 (1990), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 841 (1992). The Supreme Court reversed, finding the NLRB's Jean Country test
foreclosed by the Court's decision in Babcock. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
The Court's mischaracterization of Babcock was a desperate attempt to shoehorn it into
Chevron. Lechmere demonstrates the need for a thorough analysis of the correct interplay
between Chevron and decisions like Babcock.
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as an irrational reading of the NLRA.' 57 Instead, the Court indepen-
dently resolved this important policy question.'8
Should Babcock, and similar decisions, then be binding on the
agency, or does Chevron instead compel the Court to disregard such
decisions in favor of agency deference? Professor Thomas Merrill has
suggested that Chevron's logic dictates that the agency be free to
disregard precedent, because Chevron demands that policy choices be
made by politically accountable agencies, as opposed to politically un-
accountable courts.159 But this argument ignores Chevron's position as
simply a presumption of congressional intent, which can be over-
come. 160 Deference to the agency should occur only when the Court
finds that Congress most likely intended that result.161 The question,
properly put, is whether Congress intended to confer on the agency
the authority to overrule Supreme Court decisions.
It is unlikely Congress ever intended to confer such authority,
even assuming it constitutionally could do so. 162 At the least, refusing
to imply such intent from a grant of administrative authority to the
agency is a reasonable interpretive approach. Chevron deference
makes sense because it is likely, as a general operating principle, that
157. See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 852-53 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that, 'The Babcock
Court should have recognized that the Board's construction of the statute was a permissible
one and deferred to its judgment .... Had a case like Babcock been first presented for decision
under the law governing in 1991, I am quite sure that we would have deferred to the Board,
or at least attempted to find sounder ground for not doing so.").
158. Babcock has been described as exemplifying the "judicial deradicalization of the Wagner
Act." Peter J. Ford, The NLRB, Jean Country and Access to Private Property: A Reasonable
Alternative to Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication Under Fairmont Hotel, 13
GEo. MASON U. L. REV. 683, 684 (1991) (quoting Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of
the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv.
265 (1978)).
159. Merrill, supra note 2, at 989-90. While suggesting Chevron would dictate such a result,
Professor Merrill believes the Court in Maislin correctly rejected that approach. As he states,
"There would be something unsettling about a world in which executive branch administrators
could 'overrule' Supreme Court decisions. Again, however, the outcome [of Maislin] does not
follow from the logic of Chevron and must be counted as yet another qualification on that
doctrine." Id. at 989-90.
160. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
161. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2084 (stating that the "central point [of Chevron] is this:
Courts must defer to agency interpretations if and when Congress has told them to do so").
162. Whether Congress constitutionally could confer such authority is questionable. See
Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 8, at 803-10; Farina, supra note 2, at 485-88, 498.
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Congress intended to confer interpretive authority on the agency. 16
When it is unlikely Congress intended to confer authority on the
agency, Chevron deference should not apply. 64 Because it is unlikely
Congress intended to vest the agency with authority to override the
Court, no deference to an agency's attempt to do so should occur.165
The values underlying stare decisis, particularly its role in legitimatiz-
ing the legal process, weigh heavily against an implied congressional
intent to delegate such authority.'r Thus, were the NLRB, for exam-
ple, to take the position that Babcock no longer was binding authority
because it was issued by the politically unaccountable Supreme Court,
as opposed to the agency, the Court should reject that attempt to
expand Chevron.
But should the Court apply to Babcock, and to similar decisions,
the "super strong" presumption of correctness usually afforded statu-
tory decisions? In other words, when there is an agency charged with
the administration and enforcement of the statute and the Court has
issued its precedent without deference to that agency, should the
Court be more willing to reconsider its precedent if asked to do so
by the agency?
Here, Chevron's underlying policies suggest the Court should avoid
application of the "super strong" presumption. To some extent, the
163. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2101. Sunstein asserts that "Chevron's principle of deference,
then, is an attempted reconstruction of congressional instructions, one that is responsive to the
comparative advantages of the agency in administering complex statutes. It follows that the
principle is inapplicable when the best reconstruction argues against deference." Id.
Sunstein further contends that "courts demand a clear statement from the principal lawmaker
and do not regard a vague or general grant of authority as genuine democratic authorization
for constitutionally troublesome decisions." Id. at 2113 n.195. Thus, he argues, if Congress
wants to authorize a constitutionally questionable result, it must do so clearly; intent to do so
will not be implied by the Court. Id.
Under that analysis, the Court would not infer a congressional intent to delegate to agencies
the power to overrule the Court's statutory decisions. Instead, the Court would require a clear
statement from Congress to that effect, because of the constitutional issues lurking behind a
delegation of authority to override the Court.
164. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2097-101 (arguing that Chevron deference should not extend
to questions involving an agency's jurisdiction or to a question of agency bias because it is
unlikely Congress would have intended to confer such authority on the agency).
165. Id.
166. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 315 (1989) (arguing that legislators presumably would favor application of stare decisis,
even if the precedent were "wrong," because of the costs of legal instability); Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation, Interaction and Civil Rights, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1988).
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values promoted by stare decisis and by Chevron conflict. Stare decisis
promotes certainty and predictability; once a meaning is fixed by the
Court, it remains fixed, absent a congressional overruling or compel-
ling reasons for change.167 But Chevron is premised, in part, on a
recognition of the need for flexibility and political responsiveness in
the interpretation of statutes. 1 8 Congress created agencies to adminis-
ter statutes, allowing statutes to change over time in response to new
circumstances, shifts in public sentiment, or shifts in political power.',-
If the Court's construction of a statute, not based on the statute's
clear wording but instead on the Court's resolution of an open policy
choice,l1 ° freezes that meaning, then the Court has deprived the statute
of some of the flexibility Congress presumably intended it to have.
In these circumstances, the "super strong" presumption makes less
sense as an interpretive principle.171
167. The Court has required "special justification" for the overruling of its statutory prece-
dents. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). Precedent will be overruled
where the law has evolved away from the precedent thus weakening its underpinnings, where
the precedent creates confusion or incoherence, or where it has, through experience, shown
itself to be unjust. Id.; Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 182 (1991); see'also Eskridge,
supra note 11, at 1369 (asserting that "[t]he willingness of the Supreme Court to reconsider
statutory precedents depends upon: (1) the thoroughness of the Court's consideration of the
issue in the precedent; (2) the degree to which Congress has left development of the statutory
scheme to the courts; and (3) the degree to which the precedent has generated public and
private reliance").
168. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text; see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 517
(noting that "[o]ne of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities is that
they resolve them for ever [sic] and ever; only statutory amendment can produce a change").
169. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text; see also Aleinkoff, supra note 80, at
43-45 (describes Chevron as "a major route for the updating of statutes"); Byse, supra note 31,
at 257. As Byse observes in describing the "pros" of the Chevron review standard:
Broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies enable the citizenry,
through the mechanism of electing a President, to effect a change in governmental
policies without incurring the high transaction costs of securing enactment of specific
legislation. Chevron, then, can be viewed as furthering the democratic values of
governmental responsiveness and accountability.
Id.
170. When the Court's interpretation is based on the clear wording of the statute, i.e., on
congressional resolution of the precise question at issue, it finds Congress has opted to itself
resolve the policy question, rather than to leave its resolution up for grabs in response to
changed conditions or shifting political views.
But when the Court does not base its interpretation on the clear wording of the statute, no
such finding has been made. The Court instead has made the policy choice Congress presumably
intended the agency to make.
171. Indeed, one could argue the decision should have no precedential effect at all, because
[Vol. 44
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The Court instead should be more willing to reconsider its statutory
decisions when an agency charged with the statute's administration
asks it to do so.12 That does not mean the decisions should be without
precedential effect. Nor does it mean a decision should be overruled
by the Court whenever the Court is persuaded its precedent was
wrongly decided. 17 Certainty, predictability, fairness, efficiency, and
it is at odds with the current law on judicial review of agency decisionmaking. Justice White
comes close to making this argument in his dissent in Lechmere, stating
The more basic legal error of the majority today, like that of the Court of Appeals
in Chevron, is to adopt a static judicial construction of the statute when Congress
has not commanded that construction. By leaving open the question of how § 7
and private property rights were to be accommodated under the NLRA, Congress
delegated authority over that issue to the Board, and a court should not substitute
its own judgment for a reasonable construction by the Board.
Under the law that governs today, it is Babcock that rests on questionable
legal foundations. The Board's decision in Jean Country, by contrast, is both
rational and consistent with the governing statute. The Court should therefore
defer to the Board, rather than resurrecting and extending the reach of a decision
which embodies principles which the law has long since passed by.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 853 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
172. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1023-24 (urging that Chevron be replaced by an "executive
precedent model," under which the agency's interpretation would be given weight equivalent
to the weight one circuit accords the law of another, and suggesting the courts should be more
willing to reconsider their precedents when asked to do so by the agency).
But if the agency is not free to ignore the Court's precedent, how will it be able to urge
the Court to reconsider its precedents? One way is for the agency to issue a decision applying
the Court's precedent while explaining its disagreement with it. The aggrieved party then would
be able to urge the Court for review. For example, using the Babcock case discussed earlier,
the NLRB could issue a decision along the following lines: "We, the agency are bound by the
Court's decision in Babcock unless and until that decision is overruled by the Court. In our
expert view, however, Babcock is not the best reading of the NLRA. Were the question ours
to decide, we would chart a different course from that charted in Babcock; here is the course
we would chart and why." When the Union then brings the case before the Court for decision,
as it presumably would try to do, the Court would then have the opportunity to decide for
itself whether or not to adhere to Babcock. In making that decision, the Court should take the
agency's view into account and should not rely on the "super strong" presumption of correctness
usually afforded statutory decisions.
173. Babcock, for example, as Justice White notes, may well have been wrongly decided.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 853 (White, J., dissenting). But that alone is not reason enough to
overrule a decision. Even "wrong" decisions engender expectations and create reliance interests.
See Stevens, supra note 130, at 9 nn.44 & 46. Moreover, public confidence in the rule of law
could be undermined were decisions too easily overruled. Id. at 2 & n.11. Finally, "[wihether
a precedent is seen as clearly wrong is often a function of the judge's self-confidence more than
of any objective fact." Monaghan, supra note 129, at 762. "If the Justices were to adopt a low
level of deference to precedent (for example, overruling a precedent merely deemed erroneously
reasoned), then they will have increased the chances that a subsequent Court will take the
same route," with "chaos" as the 'Inevitable consequence." Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 71.
19921
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respect for the rule of law counsel in favor of the Court's continued
adherence to stare decisis. 174 But instead of the "super strong" pre-
sumption of correctness, the more relaxed form of stare decisis favored
by the Court in common law and constitutional cases should be employ-
ed. 175 Under that standard, the Court gives its precedents a presump-
tion of correctness but will overrule them when they "no longer 'fit'
into the evolving legal terrain and are producing anomalous policy
results."' 76 Precedents, however, that have generated substantial pub-
lic or private reliance are unlikely to be overruled.'1
Finally, an agency's request for reconsideration of statutory deci-
sions should be a factor in the Court's decision of whether or not to
overrule its precedent. These requests merit attention because the
agencies are charged with the continued viability of the statutory
scheme. However, Chevron, properly understood, does not demand
that the agency's request be honored. 78
V. USING CHEVRON TO LIMIT PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT
Recognition that precedent generally should be given stare decisis
effect, whether or not the precedent was incorrectly issued under an
independent review model, forces confrontation of a difficult question.
Just what is the "precedent" that binds the agency and presumptively
binds the Court? It is one thing to say the NLRB cannot "overrule"
174. Congress, moreover, needs "a stable background of legal doctrine" against which to
assess the need for change. Winter, supra note 28, at 67. Thus, while conferring interpretive
authority on the agency promotes flexibility, viewing the Court's precedent as binding ensures
a needed continuity in the overall framework of the law.
175. See Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1409. Professor Eskridge has urged the "super strong"
presumption accorded statutory decisions be abandoned altogether. Id. He posits the Court's
statutory decisions are evolutive in nature, as are its common law ones, and thus little reason
exists to treat the two types of decisions differently. Id. at 1401-02. Also, because agencies
have the freedom to shift interpretations of their enabling acts, the Court, too, should be more
willing to flexibly approach its own statutory precedent. Id. at 1377, 1401-02. But see Marshall,
supra note 11, at 208-15 (arguing for an absolute rule of stare decisis).
176. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1386; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841,
853 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (putting Babcock into this category); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992) (discussing the circumstances that will support overruling
constitutional precedent).
177. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1386. Also unlikely candidates for overruling would be
precedents that have become "building block[s]" for law developed under a particular statute. Id.
178. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 1024 (recognizing the agency's request is an appeal to
the Court's discretion, an appeal the Court is free to deny).
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Babcock 79 and that the Supreme Court should not overrule Babcock
simply because it was decided under a review model the Court has
since discarded. 180 But once one determines Babcock presumptively
stands, the Court or the NLRB must resolve how broadly or narrowly
Babcock should be interpreted.
Numerous commentators1 81 have wrestled with defining precedent.
Does precedent encompass only the "holding" of the case but not its
dicta?'1 Does it embrace the "rule" of a case but not its rationale?1'
If so, what is the "rule" of the case? 18 Despite elaborate attempts to
craft a workable definition,' no precise and satisfactory formula has
179. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. Were the NLRB, for example, to
refuse to recognize a distinction between employees of the employer in question and outside
union organizers when resolving access questions, it would be refusing to follow Babcock. See
supra text accompanying note 151. The NLRB, however, has never taken such a position,
instead accepting the Court's distinction as mandatory.
Indeed, in its recent appearance before the Court in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct.
841 (1992), the NLRB's brief does not even cite Chevron. Brief for the National Labor Relations
Board, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) (No. 90-970). The NLRB accepted
Babcock as controlling in the case before the Court but argued its position was consistent with
Babcock. Id.
180. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., PRECEDENT IN LAW (Laurence Goldstein, ed. 1987); Gerhardt, supra note
128, at 90-98; Maltz, supra note 22, at 372-92; Monaghan, supra note 129, at 756-67; Moore,
supra note 133, at 359-66; Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1941); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576-97 (1987).
182. See Schauer, supra note 181, at 578, 595-97 (urging rejection of this traditional distinc-
tion, advocating instead that the precedential effect of one case on another should depend upon
rules of relevance); see also Maltz, supra note 22, at 372 ('Crypically, the holding in a particular
case (the 'precedent case') is said to control the result in all future cases in which the facts are
similar to the precedent case in all relevant respects."); Moore, supra note 139, at 374-75 (stating
the precedential effect of a case should depend on the "morally relevant likenesses" and the
"morally relevant dissimilarities" between the cases).
183. See Monaghan, supra note 129, at 759 (recognizing "[t]he precedential status of the
Court's reasoning need not be equivalent to that of the Court's rule or standard"). Monaghan
states that the rule is the "core of the precedent." Id. at 764. Monaghan uses Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), to discuss the precedential status of the Court's constitutional decisions.
Whether Roe's rule is to be preserved, he says, is a different question than whether Roe's
reasoning should be extended. Monaghan, supra note 129, at 759. For constitutional cases,
Monaghan asserts precedent should include not only the core rule but the reasoning or principles
underlying it. Id. at 764-65. But see Maltz, supra note 22, at 381-83.
184. Determining the "rule" often requires determining 'the appropriate level of generality"
at which to state it. Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 95 n.109; see also Neil MacCormick, Why
Cases Have Rationales and What These Are, in PRECEDENT IN LAW, supra note 181, at 157;
Moore, supra note 139, at 373, 375-76.
185. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-15 (1977); Moore,
supra note 139; Pound, supra note 181.
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yet been found.' One must recognize, however, the amorphous quality
of precedent,1s7 and that determining which aspects of a prior decision
are controlling can often involve significant policy choices. In the hands
of a Court motivated to do so, stare decisis can be transformed into
little more than "judicial politics." 188
Certainly, there are some situations where it is clear the Court's
prior decisions are controlling in the case before it. As Professor
Henry Monaghan asserts, "[e]very court and every lawyer knows that
there are precedents that simply cannot be distinguished; they must
be either followed or overturned."189 But every court and every lawyer
also knows that more frequently precedents can be distinguished. Once
a case is no longer on "all fours" with the precedent, "the Justices
have significant latitude in how they view, define, and apply the incon-
sistencies and ambiguities in such prior decisions."''9
The question posed here is what impact Chevron, with its presump-
tion that Congress intended to confer on administrative agencies the
authority to interpret their governing statutes, 91 should have on the
Court's approach to viewing, defining and applying its precedent. I
suggest Chevron commands the Court to take a narrow view of its
precedent in statutory interpretation cases, when Congress has con-
fided the administration and enforcement of the statute to an agency.
In addition, when the reach of a precedent is. unclear, I suggest the
Court should defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the
precedent.
186. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 129, at 766-67 (noting the difficulties involved in
determining precedent); Moore, supra note 139, at 358-76 (discussing differing views on the
meaning of precedent); Schauer, supra note 181, at 587 (explaining that the notion of precedent
is relative and depends upon how one categorizes ideas and objects).
187. See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 425 (noting that a precedent's meaning changes
over time by asking "Was Plessy [Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)] a case about blacks
on trains, or was it about Jim Crow? It could have been read broadly or narrowly. Which
features of a case matter will be influenced by subsequent developments in the legal culture.").
188. Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 182 (1991). There, the student author criticizes
the Rehnquist Court for playing fast and loose with the special justification standard to reject
precedent with which the Court disagrees. Id.
189. Monaghan, supra note 129, at 766-67.
190. Gerhardt, supra note 128, at 90. As Professor Gerhardt states,
[O]nce the Justices depart from the specific facts or rationale of a precedent, they
are in a position to reshape its ambiguities and tensions beyond the original config-
urations of that precedent. The Justices' efforts to define the scope of the rule of
law set forth in a prior opinion illustrate that precedents can often open rather
than close the range of choices for subsequent Courts to make.
Id. at 95-96.
191. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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When the Court, under Chevron's step one, has determined a clear
statutory meaning exists or, under an independent review model, has
resolved an open policy question, 19 it has given meaning to the statute.
In a sense, the Court's interpretation has become a part of the statute,
at least until overruled by Congress or by the Court. 19 Chevron deter-
mined that statutory silences or ambiguities should be resolved by
the agency, not by the Court. 194 Similarly, when a silence or ambiguity
exists in the Court's construction of the statute, realization of the
values underlying Chevron is best accomplished when the Court defers
to the agency's resolution of such policy choices.
Interestingly, the Court on occasion followed this approach in the
pre-Chevron era. For example, in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,1 95
the Court deferred to the agency's reading of a high Court precedent,
specifically relying on the agency's policymaking role to support its
deferential approach. 19 At issue in Erie Resistor was whether a grant
of "super-seniority" to strike replacements was an unfair labor prac-
tice. 9 The NLRB had found that it was, but the employer argued
the NLRB's ruling conflicted with the Supreme Court's earlier decision
in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.198 In Mackay, the Court
had determined the hiring of permanent strike replacements to be
lawful.'19 Certainly, a broad reading of Mackay was at odds with the
192. Chevron recognizes that open policy questions are for agencies, not courts, to resolve.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Nonetheless, as the preceding section demonstrates, there is much
pre-Chevron precedent decided under an independent review model. See, e.g., First Nat'l Mainte-
nance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Moreover, the Court has been criticized, post-Chevron, for too often
failing to defer to agencies' rational policy choices. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 985-90.
In both situations, the Court presumably has erred under Chevron, yet the precedent continues
to be binding on the agency and presumptively binding on the Court. See supra notes 162-66
and accompanying text.
193. As Professor Maltz states, "Once the initial interpretation is rendered . . . all steps
necessary to effectuate the legislative scheme have been taken. Not only has the statute been
passed, but the rights established by the statute have been fixed." Maltz, supra note 22, at
392. Professor Maltz uses this analysis to support the "super strong" presumption of correctness
for the Court's statutory decisions, but he does so without distinguishing between statutes with
an administering agency and those without. See id. But see Moore, supra note 139, at 364-65,
375-76.
194. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
195. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
196. Id. at 231-32.
197. Id. at 222-25.
198. Id. at 225 (citing NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)).
199. Mackay, 304 U.S. at 347.
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NLRB's position in Erie Resistor.200 But the Court, after determining
the NLRA itself did not expressly protect or prohibit the employer's
actions, chose to read Mackay narrowly and then deferred to the
NLRB's resolution of what, consequently, was an open question under
the NLRA.20 1
In deferring to the NLRB, the Court was candid about the policy
choices posed in this and other labor cases. Determining whether an
unfair labor practice has occurred often involves weighing employers'
managerial interests against employees' interests in collective action,
a balancing that must occur in the context of the NLRA and its
underlying policies. 2° Recognizing that Congress confided this balanc-
ing process to the NLRB, the Court declined to allow its precedent
to block the agency's rational policy choice. 203
Chevron's rationale retrospectively explains the Court's deferential
approach in Erie Resistor and commands its application in the post-
Chevron era. Under Chevron's step one, the Court determines whether
Congress has clearly spoken to the precise question at issue.20 Simi-
larly, in examining its prior construction of the statute, the Court
should independently determine whether its precedent directly speaks
to the issue at hand. 20 5 If the Court concludes that it does, the prece-
200. See, e.g., ATELSON, supra note 155, at 23-26; Paul Barron, A Theory of Protected
Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REv. 421, 457-58 (1981).
201. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 232. The Court stated:
[M]ackay did not deal with super-seniority, with its effects upon all strikers,
whether replaced or not, or with its powerful impact upon a strike itself.... We
have no intention of questioning the continuing vitality of the Mackay rule, but
we are not prepared to extend it to the situation we have here. To do so would
require us to set aside the Board's considered judgment that the Act and its
underlying policy require, in the ,resent context, giving more weight to the harm
wrought by super-seniority than to the interest of the employer in operating its
plant during the strike by utilizing this particular means of attracting replacements.
Id.
202. Id. at 228-29. Erie Resistor is unusual, however, because it discussed this balancing
in the context of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Id. at 231-33. Balancing traditionally is understood
to occur in section 8(a)(1) cases, such as Babcock, but not in section 8(a)(3) cases. See Thomas
G.S. Christensen & Andrea H. Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269, 1299-300 (1968).
203. See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 236-37. But see American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
204. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Macey, supra note 45, at 681 (stating
"courts will decline to defer to administrative agencies when their interpretation of a statute
contradicts the plain meaning of the law, the overall structure of a statutory scheme, the relevant
legislative history, or even the underlying purposes of the statute").
205. Just as the Court determines whether Congress has specifically resolved a particular
issue, the Court, too, should determine whether its precedent has directly spoken to the question
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dent should control unless the usual reasons for departing from stare
decisis are present.2 0
However, because Congress presumptively has conferred on the
agency the power to make policy choices left open by the statute, the
Court should view its precedent narrowly. In this way, the Court
would avoid foreclosing the agency from making the policy choices
Congress intended the agency to make. When the Court determines,
under Chevron's step one, that Congress has resolved a particular
issue, it is effectuating the policy choice of the most politically account-
able branch. But when it determines its precedent speaks directly to
the precise issue in question, and uses that precedent to reject the
agency's view, it is deferring to a prior decision of the least politically
accountable branch. This is particularly true when the precedent was
issued under an independent review model. Thus, the Court should
read its precedent narrowly to ensure that agency policymaking is not
unduly restricted. Moreover, once the Court concludes its precedent
is silent or ambiguous on the issue, the Court should defer to the
agency's reasonable reading of the statute and its judicial gloss.2°7 Any
open policy question exists for the agency, not the Court, to resolve.
at hand. No deference is due the agency in maling this determination, just as none is due the
agency under Chevrom's step one.
206. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of when the Court
generally will overrule a prior decision.
207. When the Court determines Congress has not resolved the particular policy question,
it defers to the agency's rational resolution of the issue under Chevron's step two. See supra
note 48-51 and accompanying text. When the Court determines its own precedent does not
resolve the particular issue before it, the Court should defer to the agency's reasonable reading
of the statute, as interpreted by the Court. Cf. NLRB v. IBEW, 481 U.S. 573, 597 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring). In IBEW, the Court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of section
8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA, finding the NLRB's construction at odds with the statute and its prior
interpretation by the Court. Id. at 585-88. Concurring in the Court's judgment, Justice Scalia
stated,
If the question before us were whether, given the deference we owe to agency
determinations, the Board's construction of this Court's opinion in ABC is a reason-
able one, I would agree with the Government that it is. We defer to agencies,
however (and thus apply a mere "reasonableness" standard of review) in their
construction of their statutes, not of our opinions. The question before us is not
whether ABC can reasonably be read to support the Board's decision but whether
§ 8(b)(1)(B) can reasonably be read to support it.
Id. at 597.
As set forth above, the Court should independently determine whether the statute or its
precedent disposes of the precise question before it. But once it finds both a silent or ambiguous
statute, and a silent or ambiguous precedent, it should defer to the agency's reasonable interpre-
tation of not only the statute but also the precedent. In IBEW, however, Justice Scalia relied
on particular statutory language to foreclose the agency's interpretation. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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The Court's recent opinion in Lechmere v. NLRB20 illustrates the
Court's improper use of stare decisis to usurp an agency's legitimate
exercise of policymaking authority. Lechmere, like Babcock, posed the
question of union access to private property. 2 9 In Lechmere, unlike
in Babcock, the employer's private property was open to the public.210
In such cases, the NLRB had developed what became known as the
Jean Country balancing test. 211 The Jean Country test weighed the
impairment of the employer's property rights against the impairment
of section 7 rights, taking into account whether the union had reason-
able alternative means for reaching employees.212 In performing this
balancing test, the NLRB found the employer's property interest to
be less weighty in Lechmere than in Babcock because the property
was open to the public. 213 Accordingly, the NLRB ordered access.2 1 4
208. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
209. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 844. In Lechmere, the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union, the AFL-CIO, was attempting to organize Lechmere's 200 nonunion employees. Id.
210. Lechmere is a retail store that sells "'hard goods,' including appliances, audiotvideo
equipment, housewares, and sporting paraphernalia." Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313,
315 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992). The Lechmere store was located in the Lechmere
Shopping Plaza, a shopping strip owned by Lechmere and the owner of the 13 smaller specialty
shops located in the shopping center. Id. The union attempted to leaflet cars parked in the
portion of the parking lot where most Lechmere employees were believed to park. Id. The
employer threatened the leafletters with arrest for trespass, enforcing its nondiscriminatory
policy against distribution of literature on its property, including its parking lots. Id. at 316.
As noted by Professor Gorman, union organizing, in recent years, has shifted from the
manufacturing plants at issue in Babcock to service and retail establishments, where the prop-
erty, while privately owned, is "infused with an open-ended invitation to the public to park,
visit, stroll and shop," making the union access question "more complex." Gorman, supra note
30, at 4.
211. See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
212. The Jean Country balancing test provides a three-factor analysis for determining
whether to grant union access to private property. See id. The Jean Country balancing test
stated:
[I]n all access cases our essential concern will be [1] the degree of impairment of
the Section 7 right if access should be denied, as it balances against [2] the degree
of impairment of the private property right if access should be granted. We view
the consideration of [3] the availability of reasonably effective alternative means
as especially significant in this balancing process.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847 (1992) (quoting Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14).
213. Lechmere, 914 F.2d at 320. The lower Lechmere court stated: "[I]f a particular property
right is diluted, as 'when property is open to the general public' and some more private character
has [not] been maintained,' it becomes more likely that other alternatives will be found unsatis-
factory and a denial of access found unlawful." Id. (quoting Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14).
It has been estimated that following Jean Country, the NLRB ordered access almost 85%
of the time. Ford, supra note 158, at 701.
214. Lechmere, 914 F.2d at 317.
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The Court in Lechmere rejected the NLRB's test as inconsistent
with Babcock.215 Refusing to defer to the NLRB under Chevron, the
Court stated, "before we reach any issue of deference to the Board,
however, we must first determine whether Jean Country - at least
as applied to nonemployee organizational trespassing - is consistent
with our past interpretation of § 7. "1216
This statement is correct, as far as it goes. As set forth in the
preceding section, Chevron does not require or permit the NLRB to
overrule Supreme Court precedent. 217 Moreover, when faced with a
question of whether the Court's precedent is controlling, the Court
should independently examine its precedent to determine whether it
speaks directly to the precise question at issue. 28 But if the precedent
does not, the Court should defer to the NLRB's reasonable interpre-
tation.2 1 9
Where the Court failed in Lechmere was in not properly performing
this analysis. The Court read Babcock as establishing a hard and fast
rule on all questions of union access to private property for organiza-
tional purposes. °20 Only if no reasonable alternative means of communi-
cation exist could the NLRB balance the employer's property rights
against the section 7 rights at issue.2'2 Moreover, the Court read
Babcock to establish that reasonable alternative means would exist
unless "the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to
communicate with them."
This may well be one reasonable reading of Babcock.m It might
even be one reasonable reading of the .NLRA.22 But, as the Court's
215. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
216. Id. at 847.
217. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
220. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848. The Court stated that "Babcock's teaching is straightfor-
ward: § 7 simply does not protect nonemployee union organizers except in the rare case where
the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to
communicate with them through the usual channels."' Id. (quoting Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112).
221. Id. at 848.
222. Id. at 849 (quoting Babcock, 351 U.S. at 113).
223. See Lechmere, 914 F.2d at 326 (Torruella, J., dissenting); Recent Developments, 104
HtARv. L. REV. 1407 (1991). But see Gorman, supra note 30, at 10 (describing the Court's
reading of Babcock as "untenable").
224. But see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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precedents demonstrate, and as the dissent points out,2 the majority's
reading of Babcock and the NLRA was not the only permissible read-
ing of either.9 6 Accordingly, because neither the language of the stat-
ute nor of Babcock precluded the NLRB's Jean Country test, the
Court should have deferred to the NLRB on this critical policy ques-
tion, a question on which the NLRA is silent.-
Lechmere presents a "true" conflict between Chevron and stare
decisis,m and its flawed resolution demonstrates the need for careful
analysis of this issue. When the Court uses its precedent to block an
agency's policy choice, it undermines Chevron. This is particularly so
when the precedent was issued under an independent review model,
225. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 851 (White, J., dissenting). In his dissent Justice White argues:
We have consistently declined to define the principle of Babcock as a general rule
subject to narrow exceptions, and have instead repeatedly reaffirmed that the
standard is a neutral and flexible rule of accommodation .... Our cases ... are
more consistent with the Jean Country view that reasonable alternatives are an
important factor in finding the least destructive accommodation between § 7 and
property rights. The majority's assertion to this effect notwithstanding, our cases
do not require a prior showing [of] reasonable alternatives as a precondition to
any inquiry balancing the two rights.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
For his reading of Babcock, Justice White relied on two cases, Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544 (1972) (stating the "guiding principle" for resolving conflicts between
§ 7 rights and property rights is contained in Babcock's neutral accommodation language) and
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976) ("The locus of that accommodation ... may fall
at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective
§ 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context. In each generic situation,
the primary responsibility for making this accommodation must rest with the Board in the first
instance.").
226. See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 851 (White, J., dissenting). Every circuit to consider the
NLRB's Jean Country test, moreover, had accepted it as consistent with both Babcock and the
NLRA. See, e.g., Lechmere, 914 F.2d at 313; Labours' Local Union No. 204 v. NLRB, 904
F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Gorman, supra note 30, at 10-12 (critizing the Lechmere
Court's analysis); Gresham, supra note 152, at 119-20, 157-65 (criticising Babcock's analytical
flaws).
227. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; Gorman, supra note 30, at 14-16.
228. See also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 73-84 (1985)
(refusing to uphold the NLRB's interpretation of prior Supreme Court case law); cf. Maislin
Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (rejecting the Interstate Commerce
Commission's statutory interpretation where the Court previously had established the Interstate
Commerce Act's clear meaning).
Lechmere will not be the last such case. Already, at least one circuit has been urged,
post-Lechmere, to refuse to defer to the NLRB under Chevron because the NLRB's decision
was allegedly at odds with Supreme Court precedent. The lower court rejected the invitation,
finding the NLRB's position consistent with both the statute and controlling Supreme Court
authority. United States Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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because no deference to the agency has ever occurred, even in cases
where the statute is silent or ambiguous.m Instead, the Court should
construe its precedent narrowly when determining if the precedent
speaks directly to the precise issue in question. Moreover, the Court
should defer to the agency's rational construction of ambiguous prece-
dent. Doing so would reconcile Chevron's concern for best effectuating
congressional intent and maintaining political accountability with the
concern for stability and judicial legitimacy that justifies stare decisis.
Whatever may be the appropriate guideposts for interpreting pre-
cedents when no administrative agency is in the picture,o Chevron
counsels a restrained judicial role when an agency has been confided
interpretive authority over a statute.231 In order for the values under-
lying both Chevron and stare decisis to be realized, the Court must
be willing to recognize ambiguities in its own precedents, as well as
ambiguities in statutes. Furthermore, the Court must defer to agency
interpretations of those ambiguous decisions, as well as to agency
interpretations of ambiguities created by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interpretive principles of Chevron and stare decisis work at
cross purposes. Chevron finds an implied congressional intent to del-
egate interpretive power to agencies because the interpretation of
silent or ambiguous statutes is an exercise in policymaking. Congress,
Chevron tells us, generally prefers to have policy made by politically
accountable agencies that can respond to shifts in political power by
flexibly interpreting statutes. Stare decisis, in contrast, promotes not
only stability in the law, but the law's legitimacy. By ensuring the
law does not change in response to shifts in the political winds, stare
decisis fosters respect for the courts and for the legal process.
When it is unlikely Congress intended to confer authority on the
agency, Chevron deference does not apply. The question thus becomes
whether Congress intended to delegate to agencies the power to over-
rule Supreme Court decisions. The values underlying stare decisis
counsel against a finding that Congress intended to confer any such
authority on administrative agencies. Accordingly, Chevron is an in-
229. See Babcock, 351 U.S. at 105; supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
230. For example, when there is no agency in the picture, application of the "super strong"
presumption of correctness becomes more arguable, as does how broadly or narrowly the Court
should construe those precedents. See Marshall, supra note 11; Maltz, supra note 22; Eskridge,
supra note 11.
231. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
1992]
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adequate basis for deferring to an agency's interpretation that conflicts
with high Court precedent.
However, Chevron does suggest a more limited judicial role in the
construction and application of those precedents. Just as the Court
recognizes the interpretation of silent or ambiguous statutes is an
exercise in policymaking, it similarly must recognize the interpretation
of its own precedent frequently involves policy choices. Therefore,
congressional creation of an administrative agency to enforce and ad-
minister the statute should lead the Court to construe its statutory
precedents narrowly and to defer to the agency's rational interpreta-
tion of relevant, though not dispositive, high Court decisions.
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